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I. Introduction
In the past few decades, the world has seen numerous cases of ethnic conflict break out. This was extremely surprising for most intellectuals as it was believed that in the face of state-formation and globalization, ethnic identities would be blurred and would eventually phase out. Thus in the post-80’s era, the emergence of ethnic identities which were stronger than ever and the eruption of large scale violence driven by ethnic tensions was a cause for both, surprise and concern.
Naturally, this led to the ubiquitous question: What causes ethnic tensions to escalate to the point of large scale genocide? The answer has been examined from all possible angles using different case studies. This paper shall attempt to outline the main factors which lead to ethnic violence, and will point out how various cases of ethnic conflict, even though they occurred in different parts of the world, and indeed, at different times, usually have the same common elements to them. In this paper, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina will be used as case studies to elaborate the aforementioned framework.

II. Driving Ethnic Hatred: The Common Denominators
Bojana Blagojevic argues that ethnic hatreds erupt when a number of factors and certain conditions converge. Ethnic conflict usually materializes when a major structural change results in an intense competition for control over resources. Throughout this time, institutions and politicians appeal to ethnic sentiments, which cause memories of historic inter-ethnic grievances to reemerge and consequently lead to the formation/reinforcement of ethnic boundaries. As a result, ethnic tensions are heightened and usually lead to violence. Blagojevic concedes that each ethnic conflict is unique in its own context, but asserts that the aforementioned factors are “common denominators”.
The context for overt ethnic hatred is usually set by major structural changes within the area, which upsets the delicate balance maintained by earlier “political and institutional arrangements”. The period of political and economic transition which follows this is crucial. To paraphrase Donald Horowitz, this occurs because the old system which sustained the balance becomes redundant, while the new system is in its early stages and hence ineffective. This gives rise to political, economic and social insecurities and fears; which in turn are exploited by political leaders in an attempt to gain power.  In this context, political agents tend to manipulate emotions and ethnic sentiments in order to gain a strong body of loyal supporters within the masses. Occasionally, these agents are backed by state institutions themselves, which set the directives for inter-ethnic cooperation. Consequently, ethnic boundaries and actively constructed and the distinction between the “self” and the “other” becomes more pronounced. The underlying idea here is to gain power by “division and control” of various ethnic groups. Inequalities are created or reinforced by limiting access of certain groups to certain privileges e.g. the right to education etc.
III. Driving Ethnic Hatred: The Immediate Causes

While obscure ethnic divisions may already be present in an area, it is clear that solidification of boundaries is more often than not, a deliberate construct. Once ethnic divisions are explicitly defined, it is natural for jealousies to creep in. However, the conversion of these into ethnic hatred, and the ways in which it is channeled is extremely methodical.
Dave Grossman, in his book “On Killing” gives a particularly incisive insight into this process. According to Grossman, there are a number of immediate factors which drive a person to kill. Although Grossman’s analysis focuses on the military strategies, it is equally, if not more applicable to the eruption of genocide. He outlines a number of factors which lead to the processes of killing.
Among this is the idea of group absolution. When operating in the form of a group, a person is more predisposed towards killing. The idea behind this is the underlying sense of responsibility to the group and its members—this feeling of accountability to the group and the group members makes a person more likely to carry out the demands of the group. A strong sense of identification with the group makes a person more likely to be loyal to the group, and less likely to rebel, since he/she believes that his actions are “for the greater good” of his group.  The legitimacy of the group and the number of members in the group matter as well. This is probably why most genocides involved systemized groups (be it the military or mobs of civilians) who were on the forefront of the killing process.
The authority behind the killings has an effect too. Through various conditioning processes in childhood, humans have always been taught to respect authority (and to submit to it) be it their parents or the president. This innate characteristic of deferring to the demands set down by people in positions of authority is a driving factor behind killings too. The stronger the demand to kill and the greater the legitimacy of the authority, the greater would be the predisposition to kill. This links up to the idea of political leaders and institutions being the driving forces behind genocides. This also, to some extent, explains the quest for power by these agents, which forms a vicious cycle—the stronger their support among the masses, the more legitimate their position in the community, and the greater their hold over the community. As mentioned previously, one way to gain unflinching support from the masses is to play up ethnic sentiments.

“Leaders with legitimate, societally sanctioned authority have greater influence…and
legitimate, lawful demands are more likely to be obeyed than illegal or unanticipated
demands. Gang leaders and mercenary commanders have to carefully work around their
shortcomings in this area, but military officers (with their trappings of power and the
legitimate authority of their nation behind them) have tremendous potential to cause their soldiers to overcome individual resistance and reluctance in combat.” (Grossman, 146)
Throughout this process, the “Distance” factor is crucial. Often, there is a deliberate attempt to create emotional distances between the two groups. These distances can be cultural, moral, or social. Grossman describes cultural distance as a deliberate effort to dehumanize (or indeed demonize) the victims by the use of racial and ethnic boundaries. The use of language in this regard plays an important role: derogatory terms (which equate the victims to insects or animals) are often used to achieve this purpose. Moral distances are created by lending the cause a moral cause and in this manner, legitimizing it. The approach is two pronged: the victims are portrayed as criminals who must be punished. And this in turn provides legitimacy to the cause itself: it is the duty of the killer to punish the guilty parties. Social distances on the other hand, take into consideration economic and class divisions: rifts are created between people coming from different socio-economic backgrounds. In simpler terms, the rich and the poor, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are encouraged to air their grievances against each other, which create divisions. The synergistic effect of all these factors often leads to a violent outpour of ethnic hatred.
IV. The Rwandan Genocide: April to July 1994
History and Context:
Known as the "land of a thousand hills," Rwanda is a mountainous country located on the far western edge of the continent of Africa. Its population, having a historically high density in all of Africa, is divided into three coexisting tribes. As of before the genocide (1991 census), the population of 7.7 million people consisted of the strong & sturdy, but darker and shorter, Hutu majority of about 90%, the tall and slim Tutsi minority of about 9%, and a marginalized pygmy Twa minority of just about 1% (Shyaka, 9).
It is believed that the Hutus were the original inhabitants of the land of Rwanda, while the Tutsis were a migrant tribe from Northern Africa who settled in the region sometime between the 11th and 15th century. Historically, the three groups have been discriminated not only in terms of their physical dissimilarities, but the disparity in their economic conditions also contributed towards the deepening of the ethnic divide. The Hutu majority belonged to the lower-class professionals, such as farmers and laborers, whereas the Tutsis were landowners and merchants. This gave rise to a patron-client relationship and consequently a socio-economic hegemony in which the Tutsis were the land owners while the Hutus worked the land. The Twa were completely on the other side of the economic divide, being hunters and gatherers who dwelled in forests.
Before the beginning of colonial rule in 1895, Rwanda was a monarchical state, the royal family being Tutsi, but without their ethnicity causing a divide. Despite the existence of these differences, the groups still shared a common language and culture—to the extent that there were not only business exchanges between them but also intermarriages.
The colonial administrators of Rwanda (initially the Germans followed by the Belgians who replaced them), brought in a new regime which worked on the principle of “divide and rule”. Tutsis were given prominent positions of power while the Hutus were neglected. Over time, the
Tutsis began to resent the Belgians they wanted more power and greater autonomy from the colonial state. The Hutus were already resentful towards the Tutsis and the colonial rulers. In1959, the Hutus rebelled against the state. The growing resentment was eventually realized by the Belgians and fearing that their rule was nearing its end, they decided to shift their support to the Hutus and take back some of the power given to Tutsis. What followed was a period of bitterness among the two groups, and despite the attempts of the Belgians to sustain their rule, on July 1, 1962, independence was granted to Rwanda with the Hutu Grégoire Kayibanda as the President.
The Causes:
Between April and June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in a few weeks only.The genocide was sparked by the death of the President, Habyarimana by a plane crash. But it is not enough to say that this incident sparked a three month long violence alone, the tension between the Hutus and the Tutsis had existed since the pre-colonial and colonial period.
The colonial administrators of Rwanda were the ones to sow seeds of rift among the three ethnic groups which previously lived in peaceful coexistence. They mistakenly believed that power in the country was organized along ethnic lines, and hence formulated policies which favoured the Tutsis while also giving them positions of power in the government. Moreover, because of the eugenics movement in Europe and the US, scientists arrived to measure the “brains” of the Rwandans, and because Tutsi skulls were bigger and also because their lighter skin contributed to belief that they were of Caucasian descent, the “superiority” of Tutsis over Hutus was reinforced by the Belgians. This also supported their belief that because the Tutsis were relatively more like the Europeans (with their lighter skin and bigger brains), they should have more of a right to rule with the Belgians. Eventually, the Tutsis too started believing in their superiority and began using their power over the Hutus to suppress the latter. The issuance of identity cards based on ethnic lines institutionalized differences which were previously unclear.
At the same time, the Belgians, the Catholic Church and Tutsis also jointly propagated the Hamitic theory (that the Tutsis were descended from Prophet Noah’s son Ham) to psychologically oppress the Hutus. The general idea behind this was that the Tutsis were genetically linked to the White man, and hence were the superior race. The Hutus flipped it around and re-framed it as a defense mechanism, by transforming their very inferiority into rightful supremacy in Rwanda, with the Tutsi superiority translating into an “illegitimate foreignness” to rule in the country.
Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church, the primary educators in the country, further deepened the divide by separating educational systems for each of the two groups and denying access to the Hutus, to the schools run under Belgian administration. Hence, in the 1940s and 1950s, the majority of the students remained Tutsis despite the Hutus’ evident majority. Just before the Rwandan independence, however, the Church suddenly changed its priorities, perhaps as a response to the Hutu rebellion. The missionaries now began to identify with the Hutu masses, and taught them to perceive themselves as a marginalized majority, in order to win support among the Hutu masses.
Kayibanda’s regime itself was met with disapproval as it incited ethnic hatred in schools and universities as it drew its strength from a pro-Hutu racist ideology. Soon, the Parmehutu party imposed a coup, putting a Rwandan (Hutu), Juvenal Habyarimana in power. During his reign, there interclass differences magnified due to economic restructuring, notably the fall in coffee prices that hurt the farmers and peasants the most. Moreover, the disparity between rich and poor grew enormously throughout the country and the political and social distance between elites and the predominantly rural poor grew as well. The situation worsened with a drought in 1990 which further aggravated the condition of the poor, widening the interclass gap. Linking this back to the general theories mentioned above, it is clear how structural and economic changes after the fall of colonialism led to fear and resentment among the two groups, with both groups attempting to compete for control over resources.
After independence, during Habyarimana’s presidency, Tutsi refugees started gaining power under the banner of an institutionalized party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Mr. Kagame. Unrest resulted between the two groups and Habyarimana chose this opportunity to gain the support of dissident Hutus. The murder of Habyarimana led the Hutus to believe that it was definitely the work of a Tutsi.
What followed was a catastrophic massacre. However, most of the regions remained peaceful. “The killings, where they took place, were orchestrated by various elites and targeted different groups with different degrees of success throughout the country” (Jefremovas). Kibungo was the city where the most horrific genocide took place. Here we can see how social distances come into play—killings were orchestrated by the elites against the commoners. Recruits were dispatched all over the country to kill the Tutsis and even moderate Hutus. And soon, ordinary citizens joined in this war to annihilate the Tutsis.
To further encourage the people, a RTLM radio propaganda led by Interahamwe was mobilized.Moreover, magazines like Kangura and Kanguka were published. Kangura was published in response to Kanguka, a publication by RPF. Kangura consisted of the “Hutu Ten Commandments” which laid down the rules for Hutus. March 1993 issue advised, “A cockroach gives birth to a cockroach… the history of Rwanda shows us that a Tutsi always stays exactly the same that he has never changed” (Kangura). This was the process of dehumanizing the Tutsis, creating a cultural distances. Moral distances were created by labeling the Tutsis as oppressors and invaders who must be expelled from Rwanda, the Hutuland. The propaganda was backed by the government, the military as well as independent sources, which institutionalized the cause and lent it legitimacy.
Hutus were encouraged to fight against them by offering monetary and property incentives. It was clear that therebels had the state’s backing and the incentive offered to them was to “kill orbe killed”. Throughout this period, there was intentional use of ethnic violence for political ends,as ‘the killings were ordered from above and the majority carried out by the militias’(AfricanRights)
Efforts by the UN failed to bring about a cease fire. In fact, as soon as the UN peacekeepers werewithdrawn from Rwanda, there was ‘intensification in the call for extermination of the Tutsis’ (Jefremovas). People who were better off than their neighbors were attacked and with time the ‘killings became an end in themselves’ (Jefremovas). According to Jefremovas, the anti-Tutsi sentiment had been instilled in the people with the help of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Rwanda. The regime fostered by the Belgians was corrupt and magnified peasantry, primarily the reason why most of the Rwandan Tutsis have remained poor peasants. He also believes that the ethnic violence was more of a struggle between the elites, ‘the so-called “spontaneous ethnic violence” can be shown to have been systematic and cold-blooded’ (Jefremovas). According to him what lead Rwanda into this bloodshed was the “growing landlessness, disparities between rich and poor, the ambitions of an increasingly ruthless elite losing their grip on power, regional politics and regional dynamics” (Jefremovas).
After the Genocide
In July, the RPF declared a ceasefire and the government collapsed with the capture of Kigali-the capital of Rwanda. With RPF’s victory apparent, many Hutus fled to Zaire (now Congo). A multi-ethnic government was set up but it was soon dissolved. However, the presence of Hutu militias in Congo has led to a lot of conflicts. Now, Rwanda’s government is led by Tutsis who are trying to make a constant effort to subdue militant Hutus. Although, ethnicity is still a divisive issue, a few efforts are being made to forge a Rwandan nationality instead of ethnic identities. One of the most overt ways in which this is being implemented is by the removal of ethnic identity from identity cards. Poverty and class divisions are still issues but there are hopes that economic development will mitigate them.
With respect to the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide, on 1996, Rwandan troops made efforts to bring back Hutu refugees. In 2002 a deal was signed to bring back the Rwandan soldiers from Congo and Congo promised to disarm the Rwandan Hutu gunmen responsible for killing the Tutsi’s in the 1994 genocide. Till date many people are facing trial for their role in the genocide. Recently, the Rwandans have blamed the French for playing a major role in the genocide. Meanwhile, the UN in its report about the conflict of 1993-2003 in Congo has suspected the involvement of Rwandan forces, UN has also warned them if this involvement is proven in court then it could amount to genocide.
V. The Bosnian Genocide: April 1992- July 1995
History and Context:
Yugoslavia was a communist country with a diverse demography. According to the census of 1991, the complex population structure of Yugoslavia included three major ethnic groups; the Croats(17.3%), the Muslims(43.7%) and the Serbs(31.4%) . Prior to the war, Yugoslavia was assumed to be a symbol of interethnic cooperation and peaceful co-existence, which is why the most communist war came as a surprise for most experts.

 Yugoslavia was ruled over by Joseph Tito, whose nationalist policies favoured a national Yugoslav identity rather than ethnic identities. Ofcourse, ethnic identities were present too, but the divisions were more for administrative purposes-- each narodi (nation) was given equal political representation in various government councils. Tone Bringa mentions how even ethnic identities were portrayed in a secular way. A Muslim narod, for example was defined in cultural (and secular) terms rather than religious terms. Bringa talks about how this conflict between secular and national versions was avoided by writing the national identity “Muslimani” with a capital letter and the religious community with “muslimani”, with small letters. So even in political language, as shown by the use of capital letters, a person’s national affiliation was more important than the religious affiliations.

Mark Thompson talks “war was waged amongst people and by the people who had lived
peacefully as compatriots all their lives.” Bringa, on the other hand, both affirms and contradicts this: “there was both coexistence and conflict, tolerance and prejudice, suspicion and friendship”,she writes. The assumption one would derive from this is that despite the existence of a strong ethnic consciousness among the inhabitants of Yugoslavia, there was no overt hostility between the various groups.
The collapse of communism and the end of the cold war in 1989 lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself and also the neighboring states including the former Yugoslavia. What followed was an intense competition for political representation among the three groups, with the result that Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 6th April 1992.
The Causes
Although Tito’s communism reinforced ethnic divisions, it suppressed the expression of ethnic conflicts. During communism there was a three-way power-sharing relationship. However with the introduction of the democratic form of government, free elections were held in accordance with the democratic ideological principles. This lead to competition amongst the three major nationalist parties representing the three ethnic groups of the region. None of the three ethnic groups involved, were strong enough to win an outright majority in the first elections. Bosnian Serb leaders strove to keep Bosnia as part of former Yugoslavia. But the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats wanted an independent state. The decision of the majority lead to the independence of Bosnia. This angered the Serbs who with the support of the Serbian government launched an armed attack against the unarmed Muslims of Bosnia. This was backed by  Yugoslavian president, Slobodan Milosevic, sent forces to help Bosnian Serbs to attack Muslims, in his quest of a Greater Serbia. This aggravated the political scenario of the country which was already in a state of turmoil.
A frequent explanation given for ethnic conflicts in Bosnia is that ancient hatred among the  Croats, Muslims and Serbs was the reason behind the mass scale ethnic cleansing. In his statement on March 28, 1993 the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher said “The hatred between all three groups, the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats, is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old” (Zupanov). Although it is true that ethnic hatred did exist during the war, it had not always been deep rooted in Bosnia’s history. Before World War II there were no major violent conflicts but during the war Croatia’s Ustasha murdered thousands of Serbs while Serbian Chetnik massacred tens thousands of Muslims.  However, the three ethnic groups fought side-by-side against the Nazis. So it can be said that the history has examples of these groups working together and against each other. Therefore, presence of hatred from the past alone was not sufficient to create conflict.
During communism “any expression of nationalism, particularly religiously-based, was ruthlessly suppressed: throwing national hatred into history’s deep freeze” (Roe, 8). When the communist system collapsed there were outbursts of ethnic violence in these regions. In the first elections each party representing one ethnic group won. This set off a competitive process in which each party tried to represent its group’s best interest. It was the movement towards democratization. According to Snyder, “a country’s first steps towards democracy spur the development of nationalism and heighten the risk of international war and internal ethnic conflict”. Similarly Vejvoda argues “Majoritarian democracy has proved fatal in case of Bosnia
Nationalist intellectuals and leaders used the weapons of nationalist rhetoric to intensify ethnic divisions and ethnic intolerance. They used term like ‘us: our ethnic group’ being exploited by ‘them: other ethnic groups’. Those who opposed the process of ethnic homogenization were marginalized. Animosities were magnified by press, leading to further violence. Radovan Karadzic gave an example: a Bosnian Serb leader during the war said to the American Ambassador of Yugoslavia, “You have to understand Serbs, Mr. Zimmermen. They have been betrayed for centuries. Today they cannot live with other nations. They must have their own existence.” The media too, was used as a means for propaganda. Leaders like Milosevic and Karadzic took full advantage of national newspapers, radios and televisions in order create fear and hatred to win over public support. Radio Television Belgrade, Radio Television Novi Sad (RTNS) and Radio Television Pristina (RTP) were centralized and were the main mouthpieces of Milosevic’s propaganda machine.
The collapse of communism and movement towards democracy meant that there was also a transition towards free economy. This marked the economic crises. Each group believed that the other would deny them a fair share of the limited resources hence each ethnic party was trying to get its hand on the limited economic resources. This lead to negative competition, falling living standards and rise in unemployment which increased the intolerance between these groups and this was the beginning of a violent armed conflict. The war, largely portrayed as a deep rooted, tribal conflict was in reality “created, nurtured and by competing political forces.”(Thompson) Hence this conflict was infact “a culmination of political conflict among several centers of power”, which included both internal and external forces.
After the Conflict 
The post war peace keeping effort was helped along by NATO, which stationed its troops in various places inside the country. Today 15 year, after the war wartime refugees have returned and most of the war damage has been repaired. Although a democratic process is in place by which free and fair elections are held, the political parties are still based on ethnic divisions. Bosnia now operates as a single state which holds the Muslims and the Croats communities. It is said that the dayton records play an important role in the maintenance of the peace. Economic process is still slow although bosnia is trying to get membership of EU.(BBC, 2005)
The political leaders responsible for the war were arrested. Milosevic’s trial was suspended following his death in custody in 2006. Karadzic and his military commander, General Ratko Mladic, however are still facing trial for war crimes. (BBC,2005) .
The stabilization progress, although steady, is still in its foundational stages and it is assumed that it will take another decade for Bosnia to fully recover from the effects of the war.

VI. Rwanda and Bosnia: Comparison and Contrast
Keeping in mind the aforementioned sections, one can point out numerous similarities between the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, although there are minute differences as well.
The pre-genocide political structure, i.e. that of colonialism in Rwanda managed to reinforce ethnic divisions. On the other hand, in Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions simmered but were deliberately suppressed by the communist government in the name of a national Yugoslav identity. The structural change i.e. the transition from communism/colonialism to a democratic form of government left a power vacuum in both cases. It was at this time that ethnic tensions were nurtured by various political agents in an attempt to gain power. The methods employed for this were remarkably similar too. Blatant media propaganda was utilized in both cases, which was backed up by independent media systems as well. In both cases, appeals were made to the primordial ethnic affiliations of various groups and historic grievances were unearthed, although this was more intense in the case of Rwanda. While Rwandan propaganda was overtly hostile and strongly urged the extermination of the ‘other’, the propaganda used in the Bosnian war was relatively subtle and relied more on emotional appeal by publishing pictures and stories of Serbs who were killed by the Bosnian Muslims. Both sides made heavy use of propaganda, although, invariably, the stronger side, i.e. the one backed by the state often won out.
The manner in which the killings were carried out is remarkably similar as well. In both cases, the killings were highly systematic and organized, and were often carried out by groups of people. In the case of Bosnia, the military was mostly responsible, while in Rwanda, it was the Hutu mobs which were often backed by the military.
The role of religion is particularly interesting. In Rwanda’s case, religion was both, a secondary and an indirect factor. It was the missionaries who were partially responsible for creating ethnic tensions, although other factors played a role as well. In Bosnia’s case, religion was turned into a rallying point by the leaders, who used it to lend their cause a moral justification.
It is here that the idea of emotional distances becomes relevant once again. Cultural distances were created by attributing different ethnic identities (and religion) to the ‘Other’. Moral distances were created by the propagation of a crucial cause: In Rwanda’s case the Tutsi traitors, invaders and oppressors were to be expelled from the Hutu land, while in Bosnia’s case, the Bosnian dissidents were to be brought to justice for a Greater Serbia. In this case religious reasons strengthened and further legitimized the cause. Hence it can be inferred that despite differences in geographical locations and the demography, the causes of ethnic hatred are remarkably similar and make use of the same tools to fuel ethnic conflict.

VII. Conclusion
It has been hypothesized that globalization will lead to increasing ethnic tensions as the pressure for global conformity increases. Instances of this are already apparent in countries like France, where the French Muslim community feels marginalized. Other countries like the United States and Britain are becoming increasingly multicultural and house several diaspora communities. While ethnic tensions exist in developed countries as well, they are often defused and no large scale violence breaks out. The question which arises is: Why has there been no large scale ethnic conflict in developed countries?
The answer to this lies within the context itself: the structural change and the power vacuum. “Ethnic conflict, political violence, and wars that presently shape many parts of Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America have deep-seated structural causes” (Pedersen).  There have been cases of violence in these countries too when they were in their developmental stages: the American Civil War and the French Revolution are cases in point.
Democracy plays a role too. When properly established, democratic states often promote multi-ethnic cooperation. Blagojevic quotes Prazauskas in saying that: “In a democratic multinational state, stability is generally maintained by means of political bargaining and compromise between ethnic subgroups.”(8) This is further elaborated by a quote from Dixon who  argues that “democratic states…are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations and at early stages before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence.”
The media in developed countries is increasingly free to air its own opinions. With this emphasison the freedom and liberalization of the press, it is extremely hard for political agents to use themedia as a mouthpiece for manipulation. Education and minority rights play a role too. Education is extremely accessible and often provided by the State to ensure equitable distribution. Minority rights and anti-racism laws keep into check any differences that may arise.
Most the instances of ethnic violence point towards one common cause: inequality in terms of the distribution of wealth, power and prestige. These cases show that amongst ethnic groups, there is an internal strife to secure the best available resources. This urge to the secure the best lures them into a relationship of jealousy and competition and as a result whenever given a chance, one ethnic group tries to subjugate its rival ethnic group and also tries to gain economic and political control over it. The administrative and political set up of developed countries serves to keep this in check. Meanwhile, developing countries need to implement appropriate measures to prevent future conflicts.

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